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Abstract 
Corporate governance became a crucial issue for both business and academic world as a result of world-wide 
financial scandals; hence many studies were conducted about it. As distinct from the others, this study aims to 
determine whether there is a relation between the corporate governance sub-scores (shareholders score, 
stakeholders score, public disclosure and transparency score and board of directors score) of the firms and firms’ 
brand values by using panel data analysis for the period 2011-2015. We focus on the nexus between corporate 
governance and brand value while most of the previous studies investigated the impact of corporate governance 
on firm performance. Contrary to expectations, our results surprisingly indicate that there is a statistically 
insignificant relationship between corporate governance rating scores and brand values.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, Brand value, Borsa Istanbul. 
 
1. Introduction 
Agency theory deals with problems arising from separation of ownership and governance mechanisms (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Professional managers run a business on behalf of owners and managers are responsible 
for management in large operations. In this case, ownership and management is held by different group of people 
and it is called ‘separation of ownership and governance’ and this situation can end up with trouble if managers 
attempt to maximize their own interest rather than the interest of owners. The model behind to the agency theory 
is that human being is self- interest so everybody attempt to maximize their own benefits (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). To prevent conflict of interest, it is believed that appropriate governance mechanisms are required. At this 
point, corporate governance came to light as a proper solution. 
Corporate Governance is identified by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as whole procedures and processes needed for a firm to be properly managed and controlled. Corporate 
governance matters not only for developed countries but also have a place in emerging countries. Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) reports in England, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in USA, and 
OECD Principals of Corporate Governance (1999) can be count as corporate governance practices in developed 
countries, while Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance of IBGC (1999) in Brazil, The Corporate 
Governance Code for Mexico (1999), and Corporate Governance Principals of Turkey (2003) can be cited as 
corporate governance practices in developing countries. 
As it is seen above, every country whether developed or developing formed a corporate governance 
code. The motive behind forming a code is benefits of corporate governance. OECD sorts benefits in chapter 7 
by the name ‘Tangible Benefits of Good Governance’ of its practical guide to corporate governance (OECD, 
2008); 
 Higher profitability  More shareholder value creation 
 Better access to credit terms  Less dependence on specific people to run the business 
 Higher financial leverage  Higher stock return 
 Higher liquidity for share  More recognition from stakeholders 
 Lower cost of capital  Higher investor community confidence 
 More dividend payout  Better decision making process 
 Positive market reaction for announcement of 
corporate governance improvement 
 Greater confidence in carrying out mergers and acquisitions 
because of increased standards of transparency  
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2. Corporate Governance in Turkey  
There is no generally accepted corporate governance principles in the world, various corporate governance 
practices were actualized in different countries based on country specific issues. In line with this, Corporate 
Governance Principles of Turkey issued by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) in 2003 in order to 
increase competitive power of financial market. Corporate Governance Principals of Turkey is divided into four 
main chapters; shareholders, public disclosure and transparency, stakeholders, and board of directors (CMB, 
2003). Main chapters are also consists of subcategories. 
Table 1. CPM Corporate Governance Chapters and Subcategories 
Shareholders 
Public Disclosure And 
Transparency 
Stakeholders 
Board Of 
Directors 
Facilitating 
The Exercise 
Of 
Shareholders’ 
Statutory 
Rights 
Principles And Means For Public 
Disclosurure 
Firm Policy 
Regarding 
Stakeholders 
Fundamental 
Functions Of The 
Board Of 
Directors 
Shareholders 
Right To 
Obtain  And 
Evaluate 
Information 
 
Public Disclosure Of Relations 
Between The Firm And Its 
Shareholders, The Board Of 
Directors And Executives 
Stakeholders’ 
Participation 
İn 
The Firm 
Management 
Principles Of 
Activity And 
Duties And 
Responsibilities 
Of The Board Of 
Directors 
 
The Right To 
Participate İn 
The General 
Shareholders’ 
Meeting 
Periodical Financial Statement And 
Reports İn Public Disclosure 
Protection Of 
Firm Asset 
Formation And 
Election Of The 
Board Of 
Directors 
Voting Rights Functions Of External Audit 
Firm Policy 
On Human 
Resources 
Remuneration Of 
The Board Of 
Directors 
Minority 
Rights 
The Concept Of Trade Secret And 
Insider Trading 
Relations 
With 
Customers 
And Suppliers 
Number, Structure 
And Independence 
Of The 
Committees 
Established By 
The Board Of 
Directors 
Dividend 
Rights 
Significant Events And 
Developments That 
Must Be Disclosed To The Public 
Ethical Rules Executives 
Transfer Of 
Shares 
 
Social 
Responsibility 
 
Equal 
Treatment Of 
Shareholders 
   
Source: www.cpm.gov.tr 
Furthermore, BIST Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) is formed by Borsa Istanbul in 2007 with 
the aim of measure the price and return performance of firms with a corporate governance score of minimum 7 
over 10 as a whole and minimum of 6.5 for each main chapter (Borsa Istanbul, 2016). Corporate governance 
rating is calculated by authorized rating agencies (SAHA, JCR, ISS, Kobirate) based on firm’s compatibility of 
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principles of corporate governance. The corporate governance summary score is calculated as sum of %25 of 
shareholders’ score, %25 public disclosures and transparency’s score, %15 of stakeholders’ score, and % 35 of 
board of directors’ score. Rating scores can be 0 - 10. While, 0 is the lowest score and represents the weak 
corporate governance mechanism, 10 is the highest and it expresses the strong corporate governance mechanism. 
 
3. Brand Value  
Although value has different meanings, from financial perspective value means an amount of money that might 
be received in exchange for something. From that point of view, brand value can be described as the amount of 
money for sale or replacement of a brand (Raggio et al., 2007). 
Brand value is determined for many reasons (www.inta.org);  
 In mergers/acquisitions, brand value is important factor because it directly affects the firm value,  
 Intangibles assets as well as tangible assets are recorded in firm’s balance sheet, therefore brand 
value is required to determined, 
 Besides owners and managers, investors are also interested in brand value,  
 Brand value can be used as collateral for loans,  
 For tax requirements, brand value is needed to be calculated. 
Brand valuation is made using three different methods; cost based (creation cost method and 
replacement value method), market based (price/earnings ratio method and turnover multiples method), and 
income based (relief from royalty method, excess earnings method, price premium method and capitalization of 
historic profit method). Consulting firms like Interbrand, Brand Finance and Millward Brown conduct brand 
valuation. Interbrand and Millward Brown employ excess earnings method, while Brand Finance uses relief 
from royalty method. Although all three consulting agencies make brand valuation for global firms such as 
Apple, Google, Coca-Cola, only Brand Finance has report for Turkish firms with the name of Turkey100. 
Brand values determined by Brand Finance are employed in this study, so it is adequate to explain only 
relief royalty method. According to this method, the brand value is a price a firm would be willing to pay to 
possess its brand as if it did not own it (Brand Finance, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. Brand Value Calculation by Relief Royalty Method 
At the first step, brand strength is calculated using various dimensions including brand investment, 
brand equity and brand performance. After calculating brand strength index (BSI) score, royalty rate range is 
determined by reviewing rivalry brands in the sector. Brand royalty rate is calculated by multiplying brand score 
and royalty rate range. Third step in calculating brand value is financial forecast. To make a proper forecast, 
different factors including previous revenues, growth rate, corporate strategy, marketing strategy should be 
reviewed. At the final stage, forecasted revenues are discounted to the net present value.  
4. Literature Review 
Corporate governance was one of the topics overemphasized in the past decade as a result of scandals like Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat, Vivendi and lastly 2008 global financial crisis. The topic was held in different 
perspectives including law (Licht et al., 2005; Bhagat et al., 2008; Bainbridge, 2010), management (Ditmar and 
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Marth-Smith, 2007; Hazarika, 2012; Nadarajan, 2015), accounting (Brown et al., 2011; Baber et al., 2012) and 
finance (Harford, 2012; Liao et al., 2015). At the beginning, corporate governance was studied in the perspective 
of law. Thereafter, relations between corporate governance and business functions were investigated. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) searched the relation between corporate governance and performance by 
forming Gov-Score comprised of 8 categories with 51 factors. In study, return on equity, net profit, increase in 
sales, Tobin’s Q, dividend gains were used as performance measurement. Findings revealed that good-governed 
firms are comparatively more profitable, more valuable, and pay out more cash to their shareholders. In addition, 
executive and director compensation is most highly correlated with good performance than other corporate 
governance variables.  
Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) analyzed the relation among corporate governance and performance for 
Ukraine. Data envelopment analyses demonstrated that there is a positive association between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The result is important because it reveals that positive correlation between 
corporate governance and firm performance in developed countries is also valid in developing countries.    
Dittmar and Marth-Smith (2007) compared the difference in well-governed and poor-governed firms in 
the way of value creation. The study consisting of 1952 firms demonstrated that good-governed US firms valued 
approximately double $1.00 invested, while $1.00 is only valued $0.42 to $0.88 in poor-governed US firms. 
Moreover, governance deal with use of cash which affects firms’ future performance; poor-governed firms 
disburse cash quickly but good-governed firms do not.  
Balasubramanian, Black, and Khanna (2008) evaluated the Indian corporate governance rules. They 
revealed that rules are more appropriate for larger firms. Furthermore, they analyzed cross-sectional relationship 
between measures of governance and measures of firm performance. The results showed that there is a positive 
and significant relation among firm performance and overall GC score and shareholders right and disclosure 
indices for large Indian firms.  
Karamustafa, Varici and Er (2009) compared the pre and post-performance of firms which are involved 
in Borsa Istanbul Corporate Governance Index by using 8 ratios (current ratio, assets turnover, return of assets, 
return on equity, net profit margin, operating profit margin, debt ratio and financial leverage ratio). Results of t 
test demonstrated that there is difference in asset turnover, return on assets, and return on equity. 
Hodgson, Lhaopadchan, and Buakes (2011) investigated the impact of good corporate governance on 
firm performance as Thailand as a developing country. In the study, Corporate Governance Index generated by 
Thai Institute of Directors was used to measure corporate governance, while return on assets, return on equity, 
CFO, free cash flow, and sales per employee are employed for performance measurement. The result was 
parallel with other studies conducted in developed countries. 
Jiraporn et al. (2012) studied on association between corporate governance quality and capital structure.  
Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) metrics was used in the study to evaluate governance quality. The study 
showed that poor-governed firms were more leveraged than good-governed firms. As a result, negative 
relationship was found between leverage and governance quality.  
Sakarya (2012) analyzed the relation between announcement of corporate governance score and firms’ 
stock performance by employing event study approach. The results revealed that there is positive correlation 
between announcement of a favorable corporate governance score and stock performance. 
Coşkun and Sayılır (2012) investigated the impact of corporate governance on market value measured 
by Tobin’s Q and performance measured by return on assets and return on equity for Turkish firms. Findings 
demonstrated that positive relation between market value and performance is not valid for Turkey.  
 
5. Research Design and Methodology  
Recent world-wide scandals attached more importance to corporate governance ever before; consequently many 
research were conducted about it. Even tough, relation between corporate governance and various business 
functions such as financing (capital structure), operational and financial performance, and firm value were 
investigated; there is no previous study about corporate governance and brand value of firms. From this 
viewpoint, our study aims to find an answer for the question ‘Is there any relation between corporate governance 
and brand value?’. 
To investigate the relation, we need firms possess both brand value and corporate governance rating 
score. Our initial sample starts with 56 firms with corporate governance rating scores however not all the firms 
have brand value; final sample covers only 21 firms. In addition, not all of the 21 firms have brand values for all 
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period (2011 – 2015), we have to work with unbalanced panel data (while most the firms possess brand values 
for all 5 year period, some have brand value only 4,3,2 or 1 year). 
Brand values are used in the study as dependent variable. Brand values calculated by various rating 
agencies such as Brand Finance, Interbrand are available to public so these are employed in different studies 
(Chu and Keh, 2006; Shrider et al.,2008). In this study, brand values generated by Brand Finance are used.  
On the other hand, corporate governance scores calculated by authorized rating agencies are employed 
for measurement of corporate governance quality of firms. The summary corporate governance rating score is 
determined by 4 sub-scores; shareholders, stockholders, public disclosure and transparency and board of 
directors. Sub-scores are employed in model as independent variables. In addition, natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets is used as control variable in order to manage firm size effect.   
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the nexus between corporate governance rating scores and 
brand values. For this purpose, our model is as follows;    
ln(BV)
 i,t =α0+β1SHRHLDRSi,t + β2STKHLDRS i,t + β3DISCLOSURE i,t + β4BOD i,t + β5ln(ASSETS) i,t +εi 
Here; 
BV: Brand Value  
SHRHLDRS: Shareholders Score 
STKHLDRS: Stakeholders Score 
DISCLOSURE: Public Disclosure and Transparency Score 
BOD: Board of Directors Score 
ln(ASSETS): Natural Logarithm of Total Assets  
 
6. Findings 
Descriptive statistics about all variables are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Vari
able
s 
ln(
BV
) 
SHR
HLD
RS 
STK
HLD
RS 
DISCL
OSURE 
BO
D 
ln(AS
SETS
) 
Mea
n 
19.
36
20
5 
87.761
44 
93.69
269 
92.3691
3 
84.
09
75
0 
22.54
537 
Med
ian 
18.
98
59
3 
88.165
00 
95.10
000 
92.1600
0 
87.
10
00
0 
22.51
411 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.1
91
62
8 
5.6227
88 
4.441
210 
3.28426
2 
8.8
54
66
0 
1.507
623 
Min
imu
m 
17.
59
97
0 
68.600
00 
75.30
000 
82.9000
0 
64.
23
00
0 
19.83
787 
Max
imu
m 
21.
59
41
4 
97.790
00 
99.51
000 
99.4700
0 
96.
00
00 
26.18
399 
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Like all-time series analyses, unit root test is common practice to test whether variables is stationary or 
not. Although there are plenty of unit root tests, the most popular practices can be count as Levin, Lin, Chu 
(2002). The hypotheses of method are as follows; 
H0 : There is unit root in series 
H1 : There is no unit root in series 
Result of panel unit root test results shown below. 
Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 Levin, Lin, Chu 
Variables  t-Statistic 
p–
Value 
LBV -5.05679 
0.0000 
SHRHLDRS -5.18262 
0.0000 
STKHLDRS -14.3674 
0.0000 
DISCLOSURE -90.4030 
0.0000 
BOD -56.6558 
0.0000 
ln(ASSETS) -71.9278 
0.0000 
Panel unit root test results reveal that there is no unit root in series. As seen from Table 3, p-values is 
less than critic value of 0.05, therefore H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. In conclusion, it is seen all variables 
are stationary and there is no problem to modelling regression to investigate the relation between corporate 
governance and brand value. Furthermore, there are three methods; pooled regression, fixed effects, and random 
effects in panel data analysis. To decide whether use pooled regression or fixed and random effects, Breusch-
Pagan (B-P) Test to be performed (Brooks, 2008). B – P Test is one of the common tests for heteroscedasticity 
and its results shown below (Breusch and Pagan, 1979); 
Tablo 4. Breusch -Pagan Test 
                            Chi2(1)               
Prob. > Chi2   
ln(BV)                162.4258              
0.0000 
As seen from Table 4, LM > Chi2 is less than 0.05 so H0 is rejected. It means pooled regression model is 
not suitable, and either fixed effects or random effects should be employed for these data. Hausman Test 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Greene, 2003) to be conducted in order to decide use fixed effects or random effects method.  
Hypotheses of Hausman Test (1978); 
H0: Random effects are available  
H1: Random effects are not available  
Table 5. Fixed/Random Effects Testing Result  
 Chi–Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi–
Sq.d.f. 
p-
Value 
ln(BV)= SHRHLDR STKHLDRS DISCLOSURE 
BOD ln(ASSETS) 
3.624332         5 0.6047 
Hausman test end up with the p-value of 0.6047 which is higher the critic value of 0.05. Based on test 
statistic, H0 is accepted and it means random effect model is appropriate.  
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The result of random effect model for the equation ‘ln(BV) = SHRHLDR STKHLDRS DISCLOSURE 
BOD ln(ASSETS)’ is demonstrated at Table 6.  
Table 6. Random Effects Result 
 
We estimate panel regression of brand value on four corporate governance sub-scores (shareholders 
score, stakeholders score, public disclosure and transparency score and board of directors score) and a control 
variable (log of total assets). As seen from table, F-statistic reveals that the model estimated is significant; 
however corporate governance sub-scores are insignificant. In detail, there is a statistically insignificant and 
negative relation between shareholders score, stakeholders score, board of directors’ score and brand value while 
there is statistically insignificant and positive relationship between public disclosure and transparency score and 
brand value when we control the firm size.  
 
7. Conclusion 
As in the entire capital markets, there are many reasons for the implementation of corporate governance 
principles also in Turkey. The corporate governance concept is intended to provide the firms operate within the 
framework of transparency, fairness, accountability and responsibility is organized in order to protect the 
investors in consequence of many scandals that realized in the world markets in the past and has become a 
necessity for markets being globalized in each passing day. Reduction in risk, decrease of the cost of capital is 
expected for firms which give importance to corporate governance and fulfill the necessary conditions for good 
corporate governance and increase on brand value is also expected for these firms. Therefore, both individual 
investors and institutional investors are expected to invest in the firms which apply corporate governance 
practices properly. We looked for the answers to the questions like ‘Does good corporate governance enhances 
the brand value? and ‘Is there any relation between corporate governance and brand value?’. From this 
viewpoint, the purpose of the study is to determine whether there is a relation between the corporate governance 
scores of the firms and firms’ brand values by using panel data analysis for the period 2011-2015. When 
examining the literature, it is seen that the studies in this area are intended to determine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. In this study, we have focused on the relation between corporate 
governance and brand value as distinct from the other studies in the literature. As far as we know, our study 
bears the feature of being the first study on this subject. According to the result of panel data analysis, it was 
found insignificant relation between corporate governance sub-scores (public disclosure and transparency, 
stakeholders, shareholders and board of directors) and the brand value. A possible explanation to lack of a 
Dependent Variable: lnBV   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-Section Random Effects)     
Sample: 2011 - 2015  
Cross-sections included: 21  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 104   
Variables  Coefficient Std. Error   t-Statistic p-Value 
SHRHLDRS -0.008424 0.011371 -0.740852 0.4606 
STKHLDRS -0.009209 0.011140 -0.826629 0.4105 
DISCLOSURE  0.008197 0.012786  0.641084 0.5230 
BOD -0.009642 0.006687 -1.441945 0.1525 
ln(ASSETS)  0.394569 0.099359  3.971141 0.0001 
C  12.07109 2.210951  5.459685 0.0000 
Weighted Statistics  
R-squared 0.162360 Mean dependent var. 2.582419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.119624 S.D. dependent var. 0.415567 
S.E. of regression  0.290157 Sum squared resid. 8.250725 
F-statistic 3.799083 Durbin-Watson stat 1.193975 
Prob(F-statistic)                    0.003458 
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relationship might be insufficient number of observations. The second reason is that combining various corporate 
governance practices into one single score is quite difficult so using rating scores as corporate governance 
quality might be misleading. Further research might yield positive relation between corporate governance and 
brand value when number of observations increase.  
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